Venezuela Asks to Decriminalize Its Anti-Hate Law. What That Changes, and What It Doesn’t.

For nine years, one law has done more than any other to turn speech into prison in Venezuela. On September 28 the person who signed it in 2017 asked the National Assembly to take its criminal teeth out. That is a development worth understanding precisely — both for what it is and for what it is not yet.

What the law is

The Ley Constitucional contra el Odio, por la Convivencia Pacífica y la Tolerancia was published in Gaceta Oficial No. 41.276 on November 10, 2017. It was not passed by the elected National Assembly; it was issued by the National Constituent Assembly, the parallel body created in 2017, and the Gazette copy carries the signature of that body’s president — Delcy Rodríguez.

Its central provision, Article 20, punishes anyone who publicly “fomente, promueva o incite al odio, la discriminación o la violencia” with ten to twenty years in prison. Article 22 lets the State strip broadcasters of their licenses and fine and block online platforms that fail to remove flagged content within six hours. Article 25 declares the offenses not subject to any statute of limitations.

The Inter-American Commission’s Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression said the day the law was published that it created “sanciones penales exorbitantes y facultades para censurar a medios tradicionales e Internet” and urged the authorities to set it aside.

How it was used

The UN Fact-Finding Mission’s September 2026 report describes the law as one that “has been systematically used as a tool to quash public criticism and political dissent.” Foro Penal counts 927 people accused under it since 2017.

The cases are not abstract. Jesús Manuel Martínez was detained on July 31, 2024, in the crackdown that followed the presidential election, charged with instigación al odio, and died in custody on November 14, 2024. Perkins Rocha, a lawyer for the opposition coalition, was detained on August 27, 2024. Óscar Murillo, who leads the human-rights organization Provea, was summoned by the CICPC in November 2024 over an alleged offense under the law. Juan Valor, a steelworkers’ union leader, spent roughly a year in detention before his release in January 2026.

What the request says

The letter, addressed to the president of the National Assembly, asks for a partial reform whose object is “avanzar en la despenalización de las conductas previstas” in the law, “as part of the actions adopted by the National Government to transform the country’s criminal justice system,” and asks that it be treated as urgent. Announcing it the next day, Ms. Rodríguez said the law “lamentablemente fue mal aplicada, se hizo un uso abusivo de esa ley,” and that the reform would also “corregir desviaciones en su aplicación.”

On September 29 the Assembly created an eleven-member special commission chaired by a governing-party deputy, with three opposition members, and referred the letter to the Supreme Tribunal’s Constitutional Chamber for a preliminary ruling. Because the law carries the “constitutional” label, reform requires a two-thirds vote.

Two words deserve attention. Decriminalization is not repeal. What has been requested is the removal of the criminal offenses — Article 20 — not the whole statute. Venezuela’s press union and the digital-rights group VE sin Filtro have both pointed out that Article 22’s administrative powers over media and platforms would survive a reform limited to the criminal provisions. And a request is not a law. No text has been published; the commission has not reported; nothing has been voted.

How it was received

The opposition delegation that has been negotiating with the government called the law “un instrumento de persecución” and said it would watch whether the reform “cumpla con los fines democratizadores.” Provea: “Exigimos cambios genuinos y creíbles. El país rechaza cualquier mecanismo de simulación.” The press union: “Seguimos exigiendo la derogación.” The international lawyer Mariano de Alba called it “un paso en la dirección correcta” while arguing for full repeal and a review of every conviction entered under the law. The UN High Commissioner had said in March that he hoped a review would mean the law “is no longer used to suppress dissent,” and in June that “no progress has been made toward repealing or amending legislation that restricts civic space.”

What it means for a pending asylum case

Three things, and they pull in different directions.

First, this is exactly the kind of evidence the government will cite. Since Matter of A-E-V-M-, the question in a Venezuelan case is whether conditions have changed enough that a particular applicant’s fear is no longer well-founded. A formal move to decriminalize the State’s principal speech-prosecution law will appear in DHS submissions. An applicant should expect it and the record should meet it.

Second, what the record can say in reply is substantial. A request with no text and no vote is not a change in conditions. The Fact-Finding Mission wrote on September 16 that “numerous laws used to criminalize dissent remain in force, and the country’s extensive intelligence services and security forces retain essentially the same structures, policies and practices,” and that Venezuelans abroad “are still in need of international protection.” The minister who runs the police and intelligence services is the same one who ran them in 2024. And the charges being brought in 2026 — terrorism financing, conspiracy, treason — do not depend on the Anti-Hate Law at all. Decriminalizing one statute does not touch them.

Third, for a person who was actually charged, detained or threatened under this law, the government has now said something useful. Its own head of state has called the law’s application abusive. Where an applicant establishes past persecution, the regulations presume a well-founded fear and place the burden on DHS to show a fundamental change in circumstances. An official acknowledgment that the prosecutions were an abuse is not evidence that the fear has ended; it is evidence of what the persecution was.

Whether the reform is enacted, what its text says, whether convictions are reviewed, and whether Article 22 survives are the things to watch. None of them has happened yet. We keep a library of primary-source country-conditions reporting on Venezuela, and we will add the reform text when there is one.

This article is general legal information about a public development in Venezuela and published reporting on it, not legal advice, and does not create an attorney-client relationship. How any development in country conditions bears on a particular asylum case depends on the facts of that case. Foreign-language sources cited here would require certified translation to be filed as evidence. Consult a qualified immigration attorney about your own case. This website is attorney advertising.